Ways to Combat Drug Trafficking
There are numerous ways to combat drug trafficking, and each ofthese methods has varying levels of success. There are direct methods, likeinterdiction; indirect methods, like attacking the supply and demand for drugs;and alternative methods, like decriminalization and legalization. Drug control almostunanimously begins with penalizing the consumer (i.e., attacking the demand).From there, different political bodies have tried a number of different routes.However, the drug trade is still flourishing and there is no end in sight.
A Framework: The United Nations
The United Nations is perhaps the most active governing body inthe war on drugs. For over half a century, the member states of the UN havesought to create an international force against illicit drugs. The UN'sstrategy, however, focuses on cooperation and a framework and leaves theimplementation up to the member states.
In 1946, the UN established the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND)as its central drug-policy-making body. The53 elected member states of the CND advise the UN General Assembly on theappropriate measures that should be taken with respect to drug policy. The CNDalso monitors the implementation of the three major international drug controlconventions, which are each discussed discretely below.
In 1961, the UN introduced the first of three major internationaldrug control treaties: the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. The conventionwas necessary to consolidate existing conventions in order to simplify existinginternational law. It serves two principal purposes: (1) limit the variousstages of the drug trade to medical and scientific purposes and (2) combat drugtrafficking through international cooperation. Pursuant to the first purpose,Article 2 enumerates a list ofsubstances subject to the control of the convention, which include marijuana,cocaine, opium, and heroin. Article 36 of the convention seeks to have eachparticipating nation make each stage of the drug trade in thesesubstances—cultivation, production, trafficking, distribution, andpossession—punishable offenses. Article 35 of the convention explicitly dealswith “Action against Illicit Traffic.” It provides that each party shall makearrangements at the national level to prevent illicit drug trafficking andcontains various provisions on how these national agencies should communicateand coordinate internationally. The convention also created the InternationalNarcotics Control Board (INCB), a 13-person body of independent experts thatwas tasked with the responsibility of evaluating and monitoring aspects of theconvention. The duties of the INCB were significantly expanded when theconvention was amended in 1972. The amendment gave the INCB the responsibilityof developing and implementing programs to prevent the various stages of thedrug trade and advise individual nations of how to implement these programs.The amendment also required that any extradition agreement between two partiesautomatically had to include drug-related offenses.
In 1971, the second major international drug control treaty wasestablished: the Convention on Psychotropic Substances. The purpose of thissecond convention was to address other substances, including amphetamines,methamphetamines, and other ATS, which were not included in the firstconvention. The provisions of the second convention followed essentially theframework set forth by the first convention for these newly includedsubstances.
In 1988, the third—and most important for the purposes of thischapter—of the major drug treaties was established: the Convention against IllicitTraffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance. While the member statesbelieved other aspects of the drug trade were adequately addressed in the firsttwo treaties, there was more to be said on the express problem of drugtrafficking. This third convention expanded on the cooperation provisionscontained in the first two treaties. Article 2 of the convention provides itsscope: The purpose of this Convention is to promote co-operation among theParties so that they may address more effectively the various aspects ofillicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances having aninternational dimension. In carrying out their obligations under theConvention, the Parties shall take necessary measures, including legislativeand administrative measures, in conformity with the fundamental provisions oftheir respective domestic legislative systems. Article 3 explicitly lists anumber of aspects of drug trafficking that each nation must make a criminaloffense under domestic law. Further, each of these offenses must be listed asan “extraditable offense” in any extradition treaty between participatingcountries. The convention alsoaddresses precursor chemicals, including ephedrine and pseudoephedrine,requiring parties to take appropriate measures to prevent the diversion ofthese chemical to be used in the manufacture of illicit substances. Within its remaining provisions, theconvention addresses the eradication of cultivation of illicit drugs (Article14), the elimination of the demand for illicit drugs (Article 14), theregulation of transportation mediums for these drugs (Articles 15-19) (e.g., commercial carriers,by sea, by mail), and various reporting requirements of the parties (Articles20 and 23).
Since 1988, no additional treaties have been signed, but the UNhas not been idle in the war on drugs. In 1991, the UN created the UnitedNations Drug Control Program (UNDCP) to provide coordination among UN agenciesresponsible for drug control. Contemporaneously, the number of member states inthe CND increased from 40 to 43. In 1997, the UNDCP merged with another entityto form the United Nations Officefor Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNODCCP), which became the UnitedNations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in 2002.
Many experts and politicians have viewed the global war on drugsas a colossal failure. As theleading international body in this fight, it is difficult to argue that theefforts of the UN were successful. However, these efforts cannot go unnoticed.The international drug control treaties merely set up a framework for nationsto follow, without which there would potentially be a complete lack of drugcontrol efforts. While member states are obligated to follow the terms of theconventions, obtaining strict compliance is not easy, especially wheninternational law does not provide any practical enforcement mechanisms. Theonus is on the individual member states to implement these provisions, so it isalso difficult to argue that the UN is responsible for any failures.
However, some nations have taken the treaties more seriously thanothers. For instance, the 1970 Controlled Substances Act in the United Statesand the Misuse of Drugs Act of 1971 in the United Kingdom were both designed tofulfill treaty obligations. Whether a country chooses to strictly follow theprotocol likely depends on what that individual nation has to gain bycomplying. For narcotic-producing states, many argue that the cost ofcompliance would be high. For instance, the drug trade plays a huge role inColombia's economy. In the 1980s, the various aspects of the drug tradeaccounted for 7% of Colombia's gross domestic product. If Colombia strictlycomplied with the framework, it might have jeopardized its economy andpolitical stability.
The United States, however, has much to gain by instituting theframework domestically. The United States is not a drug-producing nation; it ismainly a drug-consuming nation. As such, the larger issue is drug abuse. In2007, for example, there were over 31,000 deaths with drug-related causes inthe United States, more than twice the murder rate. On the other side of thecoin, the United States economy would not likely suffer much from a victory inthe war on drugs. However, because there are no enforcement mechanisms,compliance like that of the United States has not been widespread.
With this framework firmly established, it is now appropriate toexamine and assess the efforts of these individual nations in order tocompletely understand the effectiveness of international control mechanisms.
Interdiction: The United States
The United States isthe unofficial leader of the fight against drugs. The United States spends moremoney on anti-drug-related efforts than any other country with an estimated $50billion spent in 2009. Theseefforts are squarely focused on two methods: interdiction and internationalfunding of other countries' antidrug operations.
Interdiction—the interception of illicit drugs before they reachlocal dealers and consumers —combats drug trafficking directly. Drugs areseized out of the hands of traffickers while in route to their destination. Thepolicy behind interdiction is that it will limit the supply of the drug market,which will cause the price of drugs to increase and, ideally in turn, causeconsumption levels to decrease.
United States interdiction efforts began in 1969 with asmall-scale project called Operation Intercept aimed at the trafficking ofmarijuana across the US-Mexico border. Custom officials stopped every car thatcrossed the border into the United States for a 3-minute inspection. However,the operation ended after 2 weeks because of complications, but Mexico agreedto more actively fight the drug trade thereafter.
The more recent interdiction efforts by the United States havebeen much larger in scale. To this end, the United States uses its militaryforce: The US Coast Guard patrols trafficking waters, other US militarypersonnel are disbanded to participate in transnational efforts, and personnel are sent to theUS-Mexico border. The effectiveness of these efforts has been well documented.In 2009, the United States intercepted approximately 109,000 kilos of cocaine. Although this number is downconsiderably since 2005, experts believe this may be due to a reduced level ofcocaine availability. Another reason for these lower figures could be increasedlevels of “upstream” interdiction. Upstream interdiction occurs when drugs areintercepted closer to their source. For cocaine, upstream interdiction haslargely occurred in Colombia and other South American countries.
Global Interdiction
Although seizures of cocaine by the United States have decreasedin recent years, interdiction efforts as a whole have increased. Despite theseefforts, experts estimate that only 55% of all cocaine was seized in 2009. Thisfigure is up significantly from 42% in 2007, yet the market for cocaine isstill flourishing. Statistics for opiates are also available but are more difficult to assessbecause when opium is processed into heroin, the output (by mass) is about 10times lower. For instance, in 2009, 653,000 kilograms of opium were seized,representing only 8% of the global supply. However, it is estimated that almosttwo thirds (about five million kilos) of the supply of opium were used to processheroin (for an output of 667,000 kilos). Of this supply of heroin, there wereseizures of about 100,000 kilos, equaling an interception rate of 15%. Opium seizures have increasedsignificantly since 2002, when only 97,000 kilos were seized. These increasedseizure amounts are largely due to an increase in opium cultivation, whichexperts predict has increased by about 40% over the past 5 years. Opium seizures occur almostexclusively in Iran (89%), followed by Afghanistan (5%) and Pakistan (4%).Heroin seizures, however, are more widespread: Iran (41%), Turkey (16%),Afghanistan (7%), China (6%), and Pakistan (4%). This is likely due to the widespreadtrafficking of heroin.
Although interception rates are much higher for some drugs (e.g.,cocaine), interdiction efforts have failed to effectively win the war on drugs.In 2009, interception rates were estimated for the four major drug groups asfollows: marijuana (10–20%), cocaine(46–60%), opiates (16–20%), and ATS (under 10%). Experts, however, estimatethat for interdiction to have a substantial effect on the size of the industry,interception rates must be closer to 70%. Thefundamental problem with interdiction is that it is nearly impossible to blockevery available trafficking route. This is especially true for heroin becauseproduction and consumption is more widespread than other drugs such as cocaine.International traffickers constantly change their methods and routes, makinginternational cooperation initiatives difficult to effectuate. Interdiction of cocaine, however, isless susceptible to this problem because of its centralized production (inSouth America) and consumption (in North America), which likely explains therelative success of these efforts.
Although increased interception rates seem to indicate somevictories in the war on drugs, other measures of success must be assessed. Asmentioned earlier, by decreasing the supply of drugs, the market reacts byincreasing prices. Policymakers hope this will lead to decreased consumption.However, this argument ignores the fact that the demand for drugs is relativelyinelastic, partly because of the addictive nature of drugs. As a result, consumption may notdecrease by as much as policymakers would expect. Additionally, decreases insupply will be offset by higher prices, possibly increasing the profits of drugtraffickers. This, in turn, could lead to more violence by attracting morecriminals to the industry.
The United States' other principal method of combating drugs isthrough the funding of antidrug programs in other countries. Perhaps the mostfamous instance of this funding is Plan Colombia, to which the United Statescontributed over $6 billion between 2000 and 2008.
Fighting the Problem at the Source: Plan Colombia
Colombia has one of themost storied histories of drugs and drug violence. The problems associated withthe drug industry in Colombia also led it to implement one of the mostcomprehensive domestic drug control programs in the world. Although Colombia'sgoals are maybe largely domestic, the ramifications of its program play out inthe transnational arena.
As the violence of the infamous drug cartels died down in the late1990s, Colombia had overcome its largest obstacle, but still had a significantdrug problem on its hands. In 1998, Colombia was still the largest producer ofcocaine, cultivating over half of the global supply. In addition, Colombia's economy faceda large downturn and its military was not able to keep up with paramilitarygroups, like the FARC.
To deal with these problems, in September 1999, then ColombianPresident Andres Pastrana announced the implementation of Plan Colombia. Afternegotiations with former US President Bill Clinton, the United States agreed tocontribute $1.3 billion to the 9-year, $13 billion plan in its year ofinception. Plan Colombia focusedon three explicit goals: (1) reduce the flow of illicit narcotics and improvesecurity, (2) promote social and economic justice, and (3) promote the rule oflaw. Within the first goal, the objective was to cut illicit drug production inhalf and reclaim the land controlled by illegal armed groups, like the FARC.
The plan sought to achieve its drug-related goals through intenseeradication and interdiction efforts. Eradication is the actual destruction orseizure of the drug crop at the source. These efforts involved locating thedrug cultivators and either (1) manually seizing the crop or (2) aeriallyspraying the crop from helicopters with an herbicide called glyphosate.Eradication attacks the supplier, unlike interdiction, which attacks thetrafficker. However, when there is less coca bush cultivated, there is lessproduct produced, which decreases the amount of cocaine flowing throughtransnational streams of commerce. The plan also included other tactics, suchas peace talks with the illicit armed groups and raking the jungle to recapturethe land.
The plan was largely successful by most accounts in itsnon-drug-related goals: The most populated roads and cities were recapturedfrom the paramilitary groups like the FARC, security was improved, and the ruleof law was promoted. However, much of the cocaine cultivation simply migratedto more rural and less populated areas, deeper into the jungle. Drugtraffickers also decided to centralize some of their power by forming minicartels in these areas.
From a domestic standpoint, Plan Colombia was also successful withrespect to its drug-related goals. From 1999 to 2009, eradication effortsincreased from about 44,000 to 165,000 hectares of coca bush, an almost 400%increase. During those years,over 1.5 million hectares of cocaine was eradicated in Colombia alone.Cultivation of the coca bush in Colombia declined from 160,100 to 68,000hectares, a 58% decrease. In the same time frame, however, production ofcocaine decreased by only about 15%, well short of the 50% goal. Some would, therefore, view PlanColombia as a failure. However, this number does not account for theinterdiction efforts that occurred contemporaneously with eradication efforts(“upstream” interdiction). In 2008, Colombia intercepted more cocaine than anyother country, seizing 256,000 kilos (compared to 64,000 kilos in 1999).Experts attribute this increase to the intensified Plan Colombia efforts andimproved international cooperation with key countries, including the UnitedStates, the United Kingdom, and Spain. When you factor in these figures,Colombia's cocaine exports decreased from 456,000 in 1999 to 194,000 kilos in2008, a 57% reduction, proving that Colombia achieved its goal. Despite these statistics, Colombiastill produced 51% of all cocaine in 2008.
Even though Colombia has had domestic success with Plan Colombia,the global cocaine market has not seen as significant of results. Productionwas curtailed in Colombia, but the globaloutput of cocaine did not decrease by the same margin. This is partly becauseof what experts call the “balloon effect.” When a country decreases its outputfor any given year, other producers—in this case, Peru and Bolivia—produce morecocaine to fill the demand of the market. Between the years of 1994 and 2008,the individual production levels of Colombia, Peru, and Brazil have each varieddrastically. Yet, every year, the global production of cocaine remainsrelatively constant between 800 and 1,000 metric tons. Like a balloon, nomatter how hard you squeeze one part of it, the air will flow to the otherparts. For Plan Colombia to be successful on an international scale, Colombianeeds the full cooperation of Peru and Bolivia and the cocaine market will be“popped.”
A Binding Framework: The European Union
The European Union (EU) faces unique challenges in the war ondrugs. While each member state has its own national drug laws, a singleeconomic market promotes free trade. Therefore, there is not only traffickingin and out of the EU but also among the individual EU nations.
To deal with these unique issues, the EU has adopted severalinternational measures. Article 31(e) of the Treaty on European Union requiresjudicial cooperation by “progressively adopting measures establishing minimumrules relating to the constituent elements of criminal acts and to penalties inthe fields of organised crime, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking.” To thisend, Article 34(2b) provides that the Council of the European Union (the“Council”) may “adopt framework decisions for the purpose of approximation ofthe laws and regulations of the Member States. Framework decisions shall bebinding upon the Member States as to the result to be achieved but shall leaveto the national authorities the choice of form and methods.”
Pursuant to its delegation of authority under the EU treaty, inOctober 2004, the council presented minimum provisions for criminal actsrelating to the illicit drug trafficking in a Council Framework Decision (the“Framework Decision”). TheFramework Decision adopts the same list of drugs as the UN international drugconventions and provides elements of crimes and minimum penalties for certaindrug-trafficking offenses.
Then, in December 2004, the council adopted its EU Drug Strategy,in effect from 2005 to 2012 (the “Strategy”). The Strategy indicates that isbased on the relevant UN drug conventions. It recognizes that despite EUefforts to battle the war on drugs, “drug trafficking remains one of the mostproductive trades for organized criminal groups in the EU.
With respect to drug trafficking, the Strategy focuses on supplyreduction. Pursuant to this goal, the Strategy seeks the following identifiableresult by 2012: A measurable improvement in the effectiveness, efficiency andknowledge base of law enforcement interventions and actions by the EU and itsMember States targeting production, trafficking of drugs, the diversion ofprecursors, including the diversion of synthetic drug precursors imported intothe EU, drug trafficking and the financing of terrorism, money laundering inrelation to drug crime. This is to be achieved by focusing on drug-relatedorganised crime, using existing instruments and frameworks, where appropriateopting for regional or thematic cooperation and looking for ways ofintensifying preventive action in relation to drug-related crime.
To achieve this result, the Strategy hoped to increase judicialcooperation and intensify law enforcement efforts along trafficking routes.Finally, with respect to the Strategy, the Council created an EU Drugs ActionPlan for 2009 to 2012. This Action Plan sets forth more specific methods toachieve the goals laid out in the Strategy.
Like the UN conventions, the EU efforts suffer from similardownfalls of a framework. Unlike the drug conventions, however, the initiativesof the EU are binding on the member states; they are not voluntary. Therefore,member states must conform their criminal laws to the minimum standards forillicit drug-trafficking offenses detailed in the Framework Decision. However,the Strategy and the Action Plan do not contain any binding commitments. Thetwo instruments are helpful for setting goals, assessing the problem, andidentifying solutions, but it is up to the individual member states toimplement those initiatives.
Decriminalization: Mexico
Mexico has been grabbing recent headlines because of the intenseviolence associated with its trafficking of illegal drugs. Mexico maybe facingthe most pressing drug-trafficking problems in today's drug market. In August2009, the Mexican legislature responded by enacting the Law against Small DrugTraffickers. The law decriminalizes the possession of small quantities ofcertain drugs for criminal use. The policy behind this law was to free up lawenforcement resources to better combat violent drug traffickers.
When a drug is decriminalized, possession of the drug becomeslegal. However, the other aspects of the drug trade—cultivation, production,trafficking, and selling—usually remain illegal. The most famous example ofdecriminalization is the Netherlands. In 1976, the government began to“tolerate” marijuana through regulation. The possession and consumption ofmarijuana are still illegal, but if consumers and select sellers stay withincertain guidelines, the police will not interfere with the drug use.Decriminalization is not legalization.
When a drug is legalized, all aspects of the drug trade becomelegal. The drug market becomes similar to any other economic market andindividual governments are left to regulate the aspects of the drug trade(e.g., the tobacco and alcohol markets). The violence associated with drugtrafficking, of course, remains illegal.
Under Mexico's law, only the possession of drugs becomes legal.Mexico is not the first country in Latin America to attempt decriminalization.Uruguay and Paraguay have had similar laws on the books for over a decade. In 1994, the Colombian Supreme Courtruled it unconstitutional to punish someone for possessing a small amount ofdrugs. Since then, despite opposition from former President Alvaro Uribe,possession of up to 20 grams of marijuana and one gram of cocaine had beenlegal. However, in 2009, the Colombian government overturned the Supreme Courtcase by amending its constitution to prohibit drug use and possession.
There are two means to assess the effectiveness of Mexico'sdecriminalization law: drug production and violence. However, as of 2012,accurate drug production numbers are not available for the years following theenactment of the law. But from a violence perspective, Mexico'sdecriminalization law has proven to be unsuccessful. Drug-trafficking-relateddeaths actually increased. In2009, the year in which the decriminalization law was enacted, there were 9,616drug trafficking-related deaths in Mexico. Thatnumber rose to an astonishing 15,273 in 2010, and had already reached 12,903after the first 9 months of 2011, up 11% from the same time period a yearprior.
Decriminalization has been fully tested in Portugal, where drugpossession and consumption for personal use became “decriminalized” in 2001. Drug possession and consumptiontechnically remain an administrative offense, but an offender will not bearrested, only cited. The focusin Portugal is on drug rehabilitation. The goal is to encourage drug addicts toseek treatment without the fear of prosecution, and the design was viewed aslargely successful. Statistics show that drug consumption decreased in severaldemographics segments. The Portuguese effort has been small in scale, but itprovides a great model for domestic regulation in individual nations.
Mexico's decriminalization law could have been successful intheory, but it likely suffered from the same defects as other drug controlpolicies. By diverting funds from the prosecution of drug users to combatingcartels and traffickers, this strategy is similar to US interdiction effortsand Plan Colombia. The reallocation of resources is intended to attack thesupply and traffickers directly, which has proven unsuccessful in the past.However, some would argue that decriminalization might be a good start.
Legalization
One tactic that has yet to be fully tested is legalization. Undera legalization framework, every aspect of the drug trade would become legal.Unlike past efforts, this method would attack the market as a whole, ratherthan one specific aspect of it (e.g., the supply or the demand). The goal oflegalization would be to reverse the trends associated with drug prohibition.By opening up the global drug market to competition, drug prices would likelydrop and profits would plummet. Violent criminals would not have as large of astake in a legitimized drug market. Without the promise of profits, criminalswould have to operate elsewhere. For legalization to work, however, it may haveto be universal—requiring cooperation around the world.
The biggest critique of legalization is that it would increase thedemand for drugs, and drug abuse would become an even graver problem.Proponents to legalization respond by arguing that the demand for drugs isinelastic—whether the price is high or low, roughly the same number of peoplewill want to consume drugs. In either case, legalization would put the onus onindividual countries to implement national drug regulation programs. Perhapsthe member states of the UN could come together as they have before to create aregulation framework. Still, many only view legalization as a pipe dream.
Futureof Drug Trafficking
The future of drug trafficking is unclear. Despite knowing wherethe drugs are going and where they are coming from, the global demand for drugshas sustained itself for decades. The massive scale of the industry has proventoo widespread for the localized efforts of the past. While these plans havebeen only marginally successful, one thing is clear from all of the failures:international cooperation is needed. Whether it is increased interdictionefforts, a binding set of international laws, or the universal legalization ofdrugs, there must be a transnational effort to end international drugtrafficking. Collaboration is needed from both domestic law enforcement andinternational organizations, and the efforts must be designed to have an impacton a truly global scale. However, the violence of the industry will almostcertainly not cease on its own. Drugs are taking innocent lives every day, andwithout decisive action, drugs will continue to be only a flight away.